Evidence Hub

Converting a drug from off‐label to on‐label use: Government subsidies and patient welfare

Wendy Olsder, Tugce Martagan, Christopher S. Tang

Decision Sciences, 2022

3 citations

Abstract

Abstract Most rare diseases have no approved treatments available, and doctors often prescribe existing drugs for “off‐label” use in the sense that a drug is prescribed for a medical condition that is different from the original condition approved by regulatory authorities. To develop approved treatments for rare diseases quickly without starting from scratch, governments have introduced different subsidy programs to entice pharmaceutical companies to exert extra efforts to “convert” certain drugs from off‐label to “on‐label” use. However, the impact of this subsidized conversion strategy on patient welfare remains unclear because both efficacy and price can change once a drug is converted from off‐label to on‐label use. This paper represents an initial attempt to investigate the effectiveness of different types of government subsidies (e.g., offer subsidies to manufacturers, patients, or both) for improving patient welfare through the drug conversion strategy. We present a three‐stage Stackelberg game‐theoretic model that captures the interactions among the government, manufacturer, and patients, and determine whether it is optimal to subsidize the manufacturer, patients, or both. We identify requisite (market and subsidy) conditions for a manufacturer to convert a drug from off‐label to on‐label use. We also determine the optimal extra development effort to convert an off‐label drug, and the optimal unit selling price for the on‐label drug after conversion. Contrary to the…

Read the paper

Related studies

Go deeper in Evidence Hub

Evidence Hub adds a study data sheet (design, sample size, evidence level, key numbers), an AI summary and a chat grounded in the paper's text.

Open this study Sign up free