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On Quantum Physics and Ordinary Consciousness

Stephen Jones

2000

Abstract

Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have proposed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of mind as the most difficult problem. When critically examined, basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of I-cannot-imagine arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine a mechanism is a rather uninteresting psychological fact about us, not an interesting metaphysical fact about world. Rather than worrying too much about meta-problem of whether or not consciousness is uniquely hard, I propose we get on with task of seeing how far we get when we address neurobiologically problems of mental phenomena.

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