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Physics-guided lightweight detection of stealthy false data injection attacks under communication impairments and model shift

Duan Y

2026

Abstract

Abstract Stealthy false data injection attacks can alter power-system state estimates while preserving the residual used by conventional bad-data detection. This study develops and critically evaluates a physics-guided lightweight detector (PG-LFD) for Internet-of-Things-enabled smart grids. The method combines DC weighted least-squares state estimation, temporal and topology-derived features, Fisher-ranked LogitBoost classification, and a shrinkage-Mahalanobis normality score with validation-calibrated fusion. A reproducible MATLAB/MATPOWER protocol is established on the IEEE 14-bus and 39-bus systems under measurement noise, packet loss, delay, attack-strength variation, and an AC-operating-point/DC-detector model shift. Across ten independent trials, PG-LFD achieved F1 scores of 0.953 ± 0.038 and 0.953 ± 0.028, with area-under-curve values of 0.977 ± 0.022 and 0.973 ± 0.020. It outperformed residual, linear, and several support-vector baselines, but did not exceed random forest or raw-feature LogitBoost under nominal conditions. At 3% noise on the 39-bus system, PG-LFD attained the best F1 among the nonlinear methods (0.896) while limiting the false-alarm rate to 6.8%, compared with 22.8% for raw LogitBoost. Inference latency was 0.040–0.053 ms per sample. Ablation showed that the one-class branch did not improve nominal decisions, and AC/DC shift caused 100% false alarms despite moderate ranking performance. The results support physics guidance as an interpretable,…

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